Columbia Law School

Scholarship Archive
Faculty Scholarship

Faculty Publications

2005

Let's Stick Together (and Break with the Past): The Use of
Economic Analysis in WTO Dispute Litigation
Petros C. Mavroidis
Columbia Law School, petros.mavroidis@unine.ch

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship
Part of the Dispute Resolution and Arbitration Commons, and the International Trade Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Petros C. Mavroidis, Let's Stick Together (and Break with the Past): The Use of Economic Analysis in WTO
Dispute Litigation, (2005).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship/2392

This Working Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Publications at Scholarship Archive. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of Scholarship Archive. For
more information, please contact scholarshiparchive@law.columbia.edu.

Let's stick together
(and break with the past)
the use of economic analysis in WTO dispute litigation

© Petros C. Mavroidis, 2005

Abstract

The treatment of a number of issues that are being routinely discussed in WTO
dispute settlement practice could benefit substantially, were economists to be
institutionally implicated in the process. As things stand, the participation of
economists in dispute settlement proceedings is infrequent and erratic: for all
practical purposes, it depends on the discretion of WTO adjudicating bodies. There
is indirect evidence that recourse to such expertise has been made, albeit on very few
occasions. Institutional reforms are necessary; otherwise, it seems unlikely that the
existing picture will change in the near future. A look into ongoing negotiations on
the DSU review however, leaves no scope for optimism in this respect: involving
economists in WTO litigation is not a priority-issue.
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1 A caveat

In this short paper, I do not address the wider issue how economics can help re-draft
the existing dispute settlement procedures. The issue addressed here is much
narrower: how economics expertise is and has been used so far in WTO litigation. At
the end of the paper, I advance some thoughts aiming to explain the scattered use in
light of the existing need for such expertise.

2 Is economics relevant in WTO litigation?

The short answer is yes. Actually, there are instances where, absent economics
analysis, it is simply impossible to complete through interpretation the largely
incomplete WTO contract: how does one calculate dumping or subsidy margin,
otherwise? Or how does one calculate damage, a necessary step to ensure
equivalence between inflicted damage and authorized countermeasures, as
requested by Art. 22.4 DSU? These are but examples, and the list of instances where
recourse to economics is passage obligé is wider. Such instances are what I will term
the inner circle of instances where recourse to economics is warranted.

There is however, a wider circle of instances where, although past judiciary practice
evidences reasonable outcomes (sometimes, at least), the use of economics can
greatly benefit the quality of legal analysis. Examples here are abundant. 1 To cite a
few: economics can help construct the anti-subsidy counterfactual and thus enable
an operational definition of subsidy in Art. 1 SCM; it can help discuss the causalityelement (which is a legal requirement for a lawful imposition of duties under all
contingent protection instruments) in a meaningful manner; it can provide a

To paraphrase one of TN Srinivasan's favourite quotes, economics can be of help in thinking about
anything.

1

3

coherent framework to discuss like products/services, the key concept in the key
obligation in the WTO edifice, not to discriminate. 2

At the same time, one should be under no illusions as to how much can be achieved
through recourse to economics. For a start, economics cannot undo economically
irrational legal instruments, like the WTO agreement on antidumping, for instance:
judges are agents in a contractual relationship where the principals (the WTO
Membership) have the sole responsibility to amend the existing contract; on the
other hand, economics will usually not decide cases. It will however, provide useful
input and contribute towards an informed decision.

With this discussion in mind we turn to a brief discussion on the institutional
dimension of recourse to economics expertise in the WTO system.

3 Intellectually desirable, institutionally possible

A look into the various provisions of the DSU suggests a rather limited role for the
WTO Secretariat in dispute settlement (see Arts. 8 and 12 DSU). In practice,
however, the WTO Secretariat plays a much more active role than meets the eye that
is confined to a reading of the DSU: essentially, almost all panel reports are being
drafted by the WTO Secretariat, panellists reacting to a draft received. This practice
is explained, and probably justified too, on many reasons. The dominant explanation
however is the lack of incentives (part-timers, little pay, with a high opportunity cost
most of the time) for panellists to do what a normal judge does.

This is in great part what the work undertaken by the American Law Institute on WTO has
demonstrated, see for a particular reference Horn and Mavroidis (2005).
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Now, who is the Secretariat? The servicing of panels has been de facto hi-jacked by
the legal services. Economists have little input, if at all. Yet, the Secretariat includes
trade economists as well. They have been used however, sparingly so. Keck (2004)
and the WTO World Trade Report (2005) provide evidence of such use: they do not
put into question at all the observation that economists will be used on ad hoc basis,
depending, for all practical purposes, on the will of the enlarged panel (i.e., panellists
plus Secretariat members).

There is no official record stating the involvement of the Secretariat either. It seems
however, that the economic divisions have been used primarily in Art. 22.6 DSU
arbitrations, that is, in the segment of the process where a quantification of
countermeasures is being requested. 3

What has been described above is unofficial use of economics expertise. Officially,
panels can invite whoever they want, whoever they believe could help them
understand better a particular case (and, eventually, help them draft a better report):
Art. 13 DSU provides panels with wide powers to this effect. It reads:

“Each panel shall have the right to seek information and technical advice from any
individual or body which it deems appropriate. However, before a panel seeks such
information or advice from any individual or body within the jurisdiction of a
Member it shall inform the authorities of that Member. A Member should respond
promptly and fully to any request by a panel for such information as the panel
considers necessary and appropriate. Confidential information which is provided
shall not be revealed without formal authorization from the individual, body, or
authorities of the Member providing the information.
Moreover, when used they have held a rather inconsistent approach in this context: in the US – FSC
case, the report holds for the proposition that it is impossible to come up with one number when the
calculation of the counterfactual (i.e., the world minus the observed illegality) is at stake. Measuring
elasticities, the report concludes that the best estimation is a range of numbers. Yet, in the notorious
Byrd litigation, the Arbitrators do come up with a number. It seems (although as stated, there is no
official evidence that this has been the case) that both Arbitrations benefited from economics expertise
provided by the Economics Division of the WTO. Of course, it could very well be the case that the
representative of the Economics Division was not heard on both occasions.
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Panels may seek information from any relevant source and may consult experts to obtain
their opinion on certain aspects of the matter. With respect to a factual issue concerning
a scientific or other technical matter raised by a party to a dispute, a panel may
request an advisory report in writing from an expert review group. Rules for the
establishment of such a group and its procedures are set forth in Appendix 4.”
(emphasis added).

A look into practice evidences the willingness of panels to use experts only in SPS
(sanitary-phytosanitary) cases, especially when confronted with contradictory
expertise. 4 A couple of words seem appropriate to shed some light on this issue: SPS
measures have to be supported by scientific evidence (if not based on precaution). A
WTO Member challenging a measure (arguing it is WTO-inconsistent), will have to
provide the basis for its challenge (scientific expertise). Almost unavoidably, it will
ask scientists to represent the scientific opinion on the field. By the same token, a
WTO Member whose measures have been challenged as WTO-inconsistent, will
have to provide the basis for its measures (scientific expertise).

There is not one reported case where panels have invited experts (other than
physicists, chemists and biologists) to provide scientific expertise. And yet, there
have been so many opportunities: almost every antidumping-litigation involves a
discussion on dumping margins, causality etc. To cite a very recent and quite
notorious example: in the recent US – Upland Cotton dispute, the panel was
presented with elaborate econometric evidence submitted by one of the parties to the
dispute. It handled it by itself. 5

That is, the panels on EC – Hormones, Australia – Salmon, Japan – Agricultural Products II and Japan –
Apples have all had recourse to expertise.
5 I am not putting into question the final outcome. In fact, I agree with much of the outcome and
disagree with certain aspects (treatment of decoupled income payments; disciplines on export
credits). But this is besides the point. Getting it right once is no guarantee that an adjudicating body
will get it right most of the times.
4
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Hence, even when having to react to expertise, panels prefer to duck the issue. It
seems that in the eyes of most panels, the dismal science is not science enough and
lay people can develop similar thought patterns (to dismal scientists) even in
absence of formal education.

It would indeed be quite encouraging for many people, myself included, if the
labour-intensive part of acquiring such education could be set aside completely.
Unfortunately, as writings by economists show, the WTO adjudicating bodies by not
consulting economists have ended up with some very messy outcomes quite often. 6

4 Why not defer to expertise?

Why are panels unwilling to have recourse to expertise? The response is not easy. In
what follows, I simply aim to highlight some of the factors that might have
influenced a passive attitude by panels so far. For a start, except for one case, there
are, in principle, no formal institutional constraints as to the legal relevance of
expertise (under Art. 13 DSU). The one exceptional case is that of prohibited subsidies:
panels can ask a group, the so called PGE (permanent group of experts), established
to this effect, to decide whether a scheme is (or is not) a prohibited subsidy. Assuming
a request to a PGE has been tabled, the requesting panel must accept without any
modification the decision of the PGE (Art. 4.5 SCM). A panel can of course, always
blame another entity assuming a type I or type II error has been committed. Practice
suggests however, that there has been not one single case since 1995 where recourse
to the PGE has been made (in more than ten cases so far). Panels (probably at the
advice of the Secretariat) might feel that they will be losing too much power by
delegating such an important aspect of their work to another entity.

See the contributions by Kyle Bagwell, Gene Grossman, Henrik Horn and Bob Staiger in the ALI
reporters’ studies cited in the References list.
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Art. 13 DSU does not replicate Art. 4.5 SCM in this respect. Panels are free to decide
on the legal relevance of the expertise sought. Still, as mentioned above, except for
the SPS cases mentioned above, they have never had recourse to expertise. The
absence of a PGE-type of legal compulsion notwithstanding, one would rationally
expect that panels in practice would defer to expertise, assuming they decided to use
such evidence. Indeed, how else (in the absence of qualified panellists) could panels
disregard scientific expertise submitted to them? Assuming they do so lightheartedly, they risk violating their obligation to justify their findings (Art. 11 DSU).
Hence, de facto, as opposed to de jure, their ‘hands are tied’ every time they request
expertise. Do they have the incentive to do that then? On the one side, they can
always (partly) blame someone else for a wrong outcome. Partly however, it will be
their fault for having chosen the wrong experts. On the other side, they will be
giving away much of their authority. Except for Nordstrom (2005), no one, to my
knowledge, has seriously studies the role and the incentives of the Secretariat.
Nordstrom’s study supports the observation made above that he Secretariat has an
important role in drafting panel reports, and points to its unwillingness to share this
responsibility. Panellists who might wish to be repeat players (panellists) should be
on the Secretariat’s good books since it is the latter that will propose them to the
parties any time a panel is being established (Art. 8.6 DSU).

Also, parties to a dispute do not often tilt the balance towards making it necessary
for the panel to have recourse to expertise: the Upland Cotton dispute is an
exception to the rule that wants parties not to include in their submissions
economics expertise. Presented with pure legal constructs as to what causality
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amounts to in say an antidumping dispute, a panel might feel less obliged to request
multivariate analysis. 7

On the other hand, there are some more legitimate reasons 8 why there is, in general,
a tendency not to request expertise: panels might feel incapable to check the value of
the expertise provided to them. At the same time, panels might legitimately expect
that (some) experts might have a (strong) incentive to abuse their position (being the
informed party in an asymmetry of information-context, where panels are the other
party). True there are some mechanisms that might help reduce the size of the
problem (by publishing, as Posner suggests, all expertise provided, assuming no
confidentiality-related disciplines are not thus violated and inflicting reputation
costs on experts who are prepared to testify anything against a certain
compensation), but it is very hard to pretend that this issue does not exist. And there
is a Division at the WTO, the ERAD (Economics and Research Analysis Division)
staffed, in its vast majority, with Ph.D economists, which could provide the ‘check’
panels might be looking for. Recourse to its expertise however, as both Keck (2004)
and the World Trade Report (2005) make it amply clear is scarce and unpredictable.

5 Can Lamy be l’ami of a much-needed change?

In this part I do not purport to come up with grand designs as to what to do. I
suggest one very simple, easy to implement solution which, to my mind, might work
wonders in future adjudication. Whenever the DSU mentions Secretariat it should
mean Secretariat and not the Legal Affairs Divisions. 9 Let me explain this point: instead
Although as I mentioned above, there are cases when even when presented with such expertise,
panels decided to rule without having recourse to economics expertise.
8 See among the many writings on this issue, Posner (1999) and Sykes (2002).
9 A look into the WTO Organigram suggests that there is only one Legal Affairs Division. However,
every division in the WTO is now staffed with lawyers. The Rules Division (dealing with contingent
protection-ism) is now servicing almost always panels through its own layers. The Services Division
7
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of having lawyers servicing panels, all panels should be serviced by teams of
lawyers – economists. 10 There is no need to amend the existing text for that purpose.
All that is required is that M. Lamy, upon arrival in Geneva (or a few days later)
indicates to its personnel that from now on words will have their meaning, and, as a
result, . His advisors can bombard him with a plethora of good arguments: antitrust
practice has benefited enormously by opening up to economics expertise. To cite
one, among numerous, examples: the European Court of Justice, not far
(geographically or culturally) from M. Lamy’s background, on three occasions in
2004 reversed the Commission’s findings on three merger cases, having first heard
economists’ arguments to the effect that the merger analysis undertaken by the
Commission left much to be desired.

I am not pretending that this change alone will solve all problems. Not at all. But I
am indeed suggesting that this is one simple way to provide rationality in dispute
adjudication. It is fast relief with all plus and minuses of such prescriptions. But, to
my mind, it is necessary relief as well, while awaiting a more thoughtful analysis of
the situation.

has followed suit and so on and so forth. In general, dispute adjudication is probably the most
exciting feature of a WTO-bureaucrat’s (with the possible exception of the ERAD) career: in between
rounds, the only activity in Geneva is dispute adjudication.
10 Ideally, economists should sit in panels and the Appellate Body.
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